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 
Abstract— A real-time realistic framework for synchronous 
generator loss of field (LOF) protection studies is suggested in 
this paper by using the real-time-digital-simulator, which allows 
the user to realistically model the generator field supply circuit. 
By using such framework, the performance of LOF protection 
algorithms can be comprehensively evaluated in the face of the 
various LOF events including the short circuit and two types of 
the open circuit events, while the open circuit occurrence cannot 
be studied in the conventional simulation programs. The 
obtained results demonstrate that the generator dynamics are 
significantly different in the face of various LOF failures and 
then all of them must be regarded to develop the new LOF 
protection algorithms.  
By using the suggested framework, the performance of some 
recently proposed schemesalong with the conventional impedance 
and the admittance relays are comprehensively evaluated. The 
obtained results from applying the various LOF failures show 
that, against the conventional relays, the new schemes cannot 
detect all types of LOF failures and so, they do not have enough 
reliability.  
 
Index Terms— Synchronous generatorprotection, Loss of field, 
Excitation system, Real-time-digital-simulator (RTDS). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
oss of field (LOF) phenomenon occurs when the DC 
source of the generator field is interrupted due to some 
events such as occurrence of a short circuit or an open circuit 
in the field circuit, accidental tripping of the field circuit 
breaker (CB), voltage regulation system failure and loss of the 
main supply of the excitation system [1]. The LOF protection 
relay (ANSI code: 40), as one of the most essential protection 
functions, is considered to trip the generator after an LOF 
incident [1], when the generator accelerates, starts to operate as 
an induction generator and draws its excitation from the power 
system in the form of reactive power.  
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LOF may cause some undesired effects for both the generator 
and the power system such as [2]: 
1. Heavy overloading of the generator stator winding; 
2. Stator end-core overheating; 
3. Induced eddy currents in rotor surface resulting in a 
heavy thermal heating in the rotor body; 
4. Torque pulsation and mechanical damages; 
5. Voltage drops in the adjacent generators and/or 
power system with the possibility of a blackout 
occurrence. 
Accordingly, it is vitally important to detect LOF quickly 
and securely, and isolate the generator from the system to 
reduce the mentioned consequences. 
The primary types of the LOF protection devices including 
under-current or under-voltage relay [3], which respectively 
employed field current and field voltage, were unable to cover 
all types of LOF failures. For instance, the under-voltage 
scheme could not detect LOF failures caused by opening the 
field circuit. Moreover, these methods could not correctly 
discriminate between LOF events and system disturbances, 
especially stable power swing (SPS) and out of step (OOS) 
conditions [2]. 
Nowadays, impedance-based relay (negative offset R-X 
scheme) [4]-[5] is the most popular scheme for LOF 
protection in power plants [2]. An LOF is detected when 
impedance trajectory enters the protective zones with a 
specified time delay. Although this relay is widely used in the 
industry [6]-[7], it is always susceptible to mal-operation in 
the face of system disturbances such as SPS and OOS 
conditions [8]. As an important example related to LOF relays 
mal-operations, thirteen mal-operations were reported in North 
American blackout in August 2003[8]. 
There are also other types of LOF protection schemes, which 
are used by the industry, such as positive offset R-X scheme 
with directional element [9] and admittance-based relay (G-
Bscheme) [10].  
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Fig. 1. Charestristic of some industrial LOF relays including negative offset R-X relay (left), positive offset R-X relay with directional element (middle) and 
G-B scheme (right).  
The positive offset R-X scheme detects LOF faster than the 
negative offset one and the directional element enhances its 
security against the external short circuit faults [1]. However, 
its setting is dependent on the system impedance (𝑋𝑠) and it is 
still prone to mal-operate during SPS [8]. Figure 1 shows the 
sample characteristic of the above-mentioned relays, where 𝑋𝑑   
and 𝑋𝑑
′  are respectively the synchronous and the transient 
reactance of the generator. 
Time delays for zone1 and zone2 in all the mentioned 
schemes can be conventionally selected as 0.1 s and 0.5 s, 
respectively [1]-[10]. However, power swing studies are 
suggested to better selection of such time delays [1], [8]. 
There is another problem with R-X schemes that such relays 
characteristic need to be coordinated with generator capability 
curve (GCC), under excitation limiter (UEL) and steady state 
stability limit (SSSL) in R-X plane [11], while such problem 
can be resolved in G-B scheme, if the UEL characteristic is 
available [12]. Reference [11] has fully discussed the 
mentioned coordination issues and has presented an adaptive 
active power-reactive power (P-Q) scheme to resolve them. 
Recently, several new techniques have been proposed in the 
literature to enhance both the speed and the security of LOF 
protection, such as: 
 Fuzzy Logic (FL), Decision Tree (DT), Adaptive Neuro-
Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS), Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) and Space Vector Machine (SVM) based 
techniques [13]-[17];  
Among them, the FLbased method [13] employs the 
impedance trajectory and generator terminal voltage (V) 
to improve the conventional R-X scheme performance. 
DT based technique [14] utilizes V, active power (P) and 
reactive power (Q) variations to detect LOF. ANFIS 
based technique [15] employs V, stator current (I) and 
phase angle between V and I to achieve this goal. ANN 
based method [16] employs V, I, P, Q and rotor angle () 
variations to detect LOF and OOS in a single machine 
system. Finally, the method presented in [17] uses SVM 
technique to enhance the security of R-X scheme in the 
face of SPS condition. 
Overall, such methods require a considerable amount of 
data for training and are highly dependent on the system 
characteristics. In addition, practical implementation of 
such methods is really a difficult task.  
 Flux-based methods [18]-[19]; 
The method proposed in [18] uses search coils (SCs) 
which should be placed in the stator slots during generator 
manufacturing to measure the air gap flux. Moreover, the 
method presented in [19] estimates the portion of the field 
flux linked by the stator coreby using generator terminal 
voltage and current signals. 
 Setting-free approaches [20]-[22]; 
The method presented in [20] uses the variation rate of the 
calculated resistance (R) at the generator terminal to 
detect LOF. Also, the scheme proposed in [21] uses the 
second order derivative of generator armature current (I) 
to detect LOF. The algorithm presented in [22] employs 
the variations of V, Q and to achieve this goal. Although 
these methods [20]-[22] are setting-free, they require a 
time delay (e.g. 1.7 s) to detect LOF and discriminate it 
from SPS. 
Although such methods have presented much securer 
performance than the conventional R-X scheme, (as 
reported in [20]-[22]), it is shown in this paper that these 
methods are unable to detect LOF failures caused by the 
open circuit events in the field circuit. 
 Index-based techniques as combination of two or more 
generator parameters [23]-[25]; 
The method in [23] uses an index based on variations of V 
and Q. Although the mentioned index is fast enough, it 
exhibits mal-operation in the face of SPS [24]. Moreover, 
time domain simulation studies should be done to achieve 
the relay setting. Another proposed index in [25] is based 
on V, Q and  variations, which requires considering a 
special operating condition of the network to adjust the 
relay setting. 
 Estimation of the rotor signals [26];  
The method presented in [26] estimates the field current 
(If), d-axis damper current (iD) and consequently field flux 
linkage for LOF detection. Although the method 
presented good results, it requires many set points to be 
identified and it may involve extensive simulation 
process. 
 Excitation and terminal voltages based technique [27]; 
The method presented in [27] uses both the excitation 
voltage (Ve) and V for LOF protection in a real power 
plant and for a particular application. This scheme may 
not be able to detect less probable field open circuit 
events, if the field voltage transducer is installed between 
the field circuit breaker and the field winding [27]. 
0885-8977 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TPWRD.2019.2897739, IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery
In addition, some research works have investigated the 
undesirable effect of the flexible alternating current 
transmission system (FACTS) devices on the LOF protection 
[28]-[32], while [28] discussed the probable undesirable 
effects of the midpoint static synchronous compensator 
(STATCOM) on the conventional R-X relay. It has been 
shown that the STATCOM affects impedance trajectory and 
increases LOF detection time for such relay. The SVM and 
ANN techniques have been suggested to compensate the 
mentioned effect. Also, references [29]-[31] have employed 
phasor measurement units (PMUs) along with the 
communication links to correct the impedance seen by the 
conventional LOF relays in the presence of FACTS devices. 
Also, reference [32] discussed STATCOM effects on the flux-
based method that had been presented in [18].  
In all, every technique needs to be verified through the 
experimental setups or software simulators [33]-[35]. 
However, the generator model available in suchsimulation 
programshas some limitations to model the various LOF 
events in the generator field circuit. For example, LOF event 
can only be simulated by zeroing the field voltage (short-
circuit), while according to IEEE Standard C37.102-2006 [1] 
it can occur in practice due to open circuiting of the field 
circuit and so on. The real-time-digital-simulator (RTDS) [36] 
provides a different alternative principle for generator 
modeling which allows the user to consider a proper realistic 
field circuit for the generator. By using the RTDS, all types of 
LOF failures and consequently LOF protection schemes can 
be modeled and evaluated. Therefore, the pros and cons of 
such schemes in the face of various types of LOF failures 
become clearer.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II briefly investigates the most important methods of 
the generator modeling in power system simulation programs. 
Section III discusses the RTDS capabilities for LOF protection 
studies and suggests a realistic framework for this purpose. 
Moreover, simulation studies are done in this section by using 
a sample single machine connected to an infinite bus (SMIB) 
system to clarify the superiority of such framework in 
compare to the conventional simulation programs. In 
continuous, the performance of some new research works 
[20]-[23] published in this field are examined and discussed in 
Section IV by using the suggested framework in Section III.  
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.   
II. SYNCHRONOUS GENERATOR MODELING METHODS IN 
SIMULATION PROGRAMS 
Synchronous generator modeling has been a popular 
research subject for quite a long time. Considering the 
objective of such studies, modeling approaches can be roughly 
divided into three categories [37], including:  
1. Finite Element Method (FEM); 
2. Equivalent Magnetic Approach (EMA); 
3. Coupled Electric Circuit (CEC) approach. 
This section briefly discusses the last approach which has 
been very often utilized to investigate the dynamic behavior of 
the generator in power system studies. 
Phase-domain (PD) model is the original form of the CEC 
model in which the generator is modeled as a set of mutually 
coupled time-varying inductances. This approach performs the 
simultaneous solution for the machine and the electrical 
variables of the network [37]-[38]. However, since the 
complicated time-variant self and mutual inductances of the 
PD model results in a heavy computational burden for 
modeling the stator and rotor circuits, this model has not been 
used in the conventional simulation programs [37]. 
To simplify the CEC further, the physical variables of the 
machine are often transformed into two-axis (d-q) coordinate 
frames by using the well-known Park transform [3] (d-q 
modeling), which is widely used in power system simulation 
programs as a more convenient solution [37]. The d-q model is 
well-suited for use in power system stability studies in which 
the dynamic response of the generator to the external 
disturbances is of major interest [39]. Although this approach 
greatly reduces the structural complexity of the generator 
model, certain details on the generator cannot be represented 
as a result of this simplification [38]-[39]. For instance, LOF 
failure due to field open circuit and stator/rotor winding faults 
cannot easily be represented in this model [39].  
In the recent years, a real-time PD model for synchronous 
generator has become available on the RTDS software 
(RSCAD) library [36], which allows representation of the 
faults in the excitation systems feeding the field winding of 
the generator in addition to the faults in the stator windings 
[36]. Figure 2 illustrates the PD type of generator model in the 
RTDS along with the general schematic diagram of d-q model, 
which is available in popular simulation programs [33]-[35]. 
As can be seen, both ends of the field winding are accessible 
in this model, while they are connectable to a desired electrical 
circuit as an excitation system. In other words, this model 
allows simulating the realistic short circuit or open circuit 
occurrence on the excitation system, while LOF just can be 
simulated in d-q model by zeroing the VF, i.e. the short circuit 
of the field. 
Universal generator model available in ATPDraw software 
[40] is another tool to do the comprehensive LOF studies. In 
all, each software/simulator with the ability to apply the 
mentioned various LOF types can be used to achieve this aim.  
However, the RTDS allows hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) 
testing. Such capability admits to imply the various protective 
algorithms on the industrial relays/platforms for different 
scenarios in real-time condition, as well [26], [41]. 
A
B
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B
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Field winding ends
G
 
Fig. 2. Schematic plan of the generator models including PD model in 
RTDS [36] (left) and d-q model in the conventional programs [33]-
[35] (right). 
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Fig. 3. Sample SMIB system modeled in RSCAD with a detailed excitation system.  
III. LOF STUDIES ON A SMIB SYSTEM BY USING THE PD 
GENERATOR MODEL IN THE RTDS  
A. Sample system 
By using PD generator model in the RTDS, a sample SMIB 
system is developed as a realistic framework to study the LOF 
phenomenon. Figure 3 shows the single line diagram of the 
SMIB system with detailed excitation system for the 
generator. In this framework, all available standard types of 
the excitation systems [42] can be used. The output per-unit 
voltage of such a system multiplied by the nominal field 
voltage (Vfb) of the generator is applied to the field circuit. Vfb 
is needed to produce a nominal terminal voltage (V=1pu) in 
no-load condition, while it is available from the generator 
open circuit test data [3]. It should be noted that, any other 
arbitrary excitation system such as three phase static rectifier 
based one [43]-[44] can be constructed and used in this 
framework. In the simulated SMIB system, IEEE-T1 and 
IEEE-G1 models are used for the excitation and governor 
systems, respectively, as presented in [42] and [45]. 
Three most important types of LOF considered in this paper 
are as the following: 
 Type-1: Short circuit occurrence in the excitation system, 
e.g. at point A of Fig. 3. 
 Type-2: DC circuit breaker opening and crowbar 
activation with interlock mechanism. 
 Type-3: Open circuit occurring in the excitation system, 
e.g. at point A of Fig. 3, and surge arrester self-activation 
to suppress the field winding overvoltage. 
Notice that only the first one can be simulated in the 
conventional simulation programs [33]-[35]. It should be noted 
that the value of crowbar resistance (Rc) is normally selected 
equal to 3-5 times bigger than the field winding resistance (Rf) 
as regarded in [19],[46]-[47]. More detailed data for the 
studied system is provided in the appendix. 
B. Generator dynamics during various LOF failures 
Case1:  Heavy load condition  
In this case, the generator delivers 0.9+j0.25 pu in the 
steady state condition. All kinds of the LOF Types are 
examined. Figure 4 depicts the variations of the generator 
output parameters including, V, I and Q for this case. c=150 
is assumed as the critical value for , while the generator loss 
of synchronism (LOS) occurs due to the LOF failure. The 
generator output parameters such as V and Q will swing by the 
slip frequency [2] after LOS occurrence, while the second and 
third types create much faster LOS occurrence than the first 
one (LOF due to short circuit). 
Case2: Light load condition  
In this case, the generator delivers 0.3+j0.1 pu in the 
steady state condition. As shown in Fig. 5, the variations of , 
V, I and Q for this case are appeared with more time delay 
than the heavy loading condition. However, generator 
dynamics after LOF failures caused by open circuit failures 
are still much faster than that caused by short circuit fault. It 
should be noted that in addition to loading level, other 
parameters such as short circuit capacity (SCC) of the external 
grid and power factor may affect the generator dynamics [2]. 
However, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 are represented to show that how 
much generator dynamics can be different in the face of 
various LOF failures in asimilar condition. 
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Fig. 4. , V, I and Q variations during all types of LOFfailures  in Case1. 
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Fig. 5. , V, I and Q variations during all types of LOF failures in Case2. 
C. A brief justification for generator dynamic during 
different LOF failures 
As can be resulted by looking at Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, in a 
specific loading, the generator dynamic depends on the type of 
LOF failure, so that LOF failures that are caused by open 
circuiting of the field with crowbar/surge-arrester activation 
(which cannot be simulated in the conventional programs 
[33]-[35]) make much faster changes in the generator 
variables than those caused by the other type. These types of 
the LOF failures may seriously affect the performance of the 
LOF protection methods reported in the literature. 
After an LOF failure occurrence, field DC current decays 
at a rate determined by the field circuit time constant [2]. So, 
the magnetic coupling between the rotor and the stator starts to 
weaken and finally cause generator LOS [2]. After that, 
generator parameters oscillate with slip frequency (induction 
generator mode). 
Figure 6 shows the generator field winding conditions 
(from viewpoint of A in Fig. 3) during the mentioned LOF 
failures where Lf and RSA are respectively the field winding 
inductance and the surge arrester non-linear resistance. Surge 
arrester parameters and its V-I characteristic (as described in 
[26] and [36]) are presented in appendix. Due to LOF 
occurrence, field current (If) will be expressed as (1) including 
two components: decaying exponential component (IDEC) 
which decays over the time and alternating component (IAC) 
due to rotor slipping of 𝑠 𝑡  [46]:  
𝐼𝑓 𝑡 = 𝐼𝑓0𝑒
−
𝑡
𝜏   
𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐶
+ 𝐼𝑚  𝑡 . sin 𝑠 𝑡 × 𝜔𝑠𝑡            
𝐼𝐴𝐶
                               (1) 
where 𝐼𝑓0, 𝜏, 𝐼𝑚 , 𝜔𝑠 and 𝑠 𝑡 =
𝜔𝑠−𝜔 𝑡 
𝜔𝑠
 are the pre-fault value 
of If, the field circuit time constant, the amplitude of the 
induced AC currentin the rotor winding, synchronous rotor 
speed and the rotor slip, respectively. 
It is clear that during LOF phenomenon, rotor slip will be 
increased and consequently the induced AC current 
component (IAC) will exhibit incremental behavior in both the 
amplitude and the frequency [2], [46]. Also, due to crowbar or 
surge arrester resistance (as shown in Fig. 6), field circuit time 
constant decreases, so that 𝜏1 is bigger than both of τ2 and τ3 
(although the related behaviors cannot be modeled as pure R-L 
circuits and will be affected by the induced AC voltages 
because of rotor slipping). So, it can be anticipated that the 
field current during the second and third types of LOF failures 
decays faster (and accordingly, LOS occurs sooner) than the 
first one. 
Figure 7 illustrates the variation of If for all three types of 
LOF failures in Case1, which is in accordance with the above-
mentioned descriptions for If behavior. 
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Fig. 6. Generator field circuit conditions during various LOF failures. 
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Fig. 7. Generator field current during various LOF failures in Case1. 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF SOME RECENTLY PROPOSED TECHNIQUES 
FOR LOF DETECTION 
As illustrated in the previous section, synchronous 
generators exhibit different dynamics in the face of various 
LOF failures. Moreover, as before mentioned, most of the 
recent research works reported in the literature have employed 
conventional simulation programs [33]-[35] in which the LOF 
phenomenon cannot be studied comprehensively as can be 
done in the presented framework by using the RTDS 
according to the related capability to model the various types 
of LOF failures. To show the effectiveness of this framework, 
the performances of the proposed techniques in the recent 
research papers, including: 
 An approach based on derivative of R [20]; 
 An approach based on the second derivative of I [21]; 
 An approach based on V, Q, and variations [22]; 
 An index based on V and Q derivatives [23]; 
Are investigated, discussed and compared with the 
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conventional R-X scheme [5]-[7] and the G-B scheme [10]. 
In all abovementioned references, only the first type of the 
LOF failures (with a long time constant) is employed to 
evaluate the associated algorithms by using the d-q model for 
the generator. Thus, by choosing an appropriate time delay 
(which is selected based on the minimum swing frequency of 
power system namely 0.3 Hz [20]-[22]), this type of LOF 
failure can be easily detected and discriminated from the other 
transients such as SPS.  
In the following, these algorithms are briefly described. 
A. LOF detection based on derivative of R [20] 
A setting-free algorithm, which is presented in [20], 
employs the derivative of R as below: 
𝐼𝑓 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
< 0    
𝑓𝑜𝑟   1.7𝑠    
         𝐿𝑂𝐹 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑                              (2) 
 
The first row of Fig. 8 illustrates the performance of this 
method in the face of the various LOF failures in Case1. As 
can be seen, this approach can detect the Type-1 LOF.  
However, it is unable to detect other types of LOF failures 
because of the fast and bipolar variations of 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
, which is 
rooted in LOS phenomenon.  
B. LOF detection based on the second derivative of I [21] 
The proposed method in [21] uses the second order 
derivative of the armature current (SODAC) to detect LOF as 
a setting-free based on the following logic: 
𝐼𝑓  𝑆𝑂𝐷𝐴𝐶 =
𝑑2𝐼
𝑑𝑡 2
> 0    
𝑓𝑜𝑟   1.7𝑠    
         𝐿𝑂𝐹  𝑖𝑠  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑  (3) 
The second row of Fig. 8 exhibits the performance of this 
technique. As can be seen, this method cannot detect the 
second and the third type of LOF failures, similar to the 
previous technique. 
C. LOF detection based on V, Q and  variations [22] 
The setting-free method presented in [22] uses V, Q and  
variations (VQ method) to detect LOF by using the following 
logic: 
𝐼𝑓 
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑉𝑘 < 0
𝑎𝑛𝑑
∆𝑄𝑘 < 0
𝑎𝑛𝑑
∆𝛿𝑘 > 0 
 
 
 
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟   1.7𝑠    
         𝐿𝑂𝐹 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑     (4) 
 
where ∆𝑉𝑘 = 𝑉𝑘 − 𝑉𝑘−1 and ∆𝑄𝑘 = 𝑄𝑘 − 𝑄𝑘−1 and ∆𝛿𝑘 =
𝛿𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘−1 are respectively the variation of V, Q and 𝛿 in two 
consecutive samples. 
The third row of Fig. 8 shows the performance of this 
approach in the face of LOF failures. As can be seen again, 
this method cannot detect the second and third types of LOF 
failures, too. 
D. LOF detection based on V and Q derivatives [23] 
The proposed method in [23] detects the LOF failures by 
using an introduced LOF protection index (LOFI) on the basis 
of V and Q derivatives as: 
𝐿𝑂𝐹𝐼 = 105 × ∆𝑉𝑘 × ∆𝑄𝑘                                                     (5) 
where ∆𝑉𝑘  and ∆𝑄𝑘  are introduced similar to the previous 
method. 
 
The LOF detection logic for this index is presented as below: 
𝐼𝑓 𝐿𝑂𝐹𝐼 > 𝑇ℎ
𝑓𝑜𝑟   1𝑠    
       𝐿𝑂𝐹 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑                              (6) 
where Th is a predefined threshold value that must be chosen 
based on the simulation studies.  
The forth row of Fig. 8 shows the performance of this 
technique in the face of various types of LOF failures. As can 
be seen, although LOFI method detects the first and second 
types of LOF failures, it is unable to detect the third one. 
E. LOF detection by the conventional R-X [5]-[7] and G-B 
[10] schemes 
The fifth and sixth rows of Fig. 8 show the performance of 
the conventional R-X [5]-[7] and G-B [10] schemes in the face 
of different types of LOF failures. As can be seen, against the 
abovementioned methods, these relays detect all types of the 
simulated LOF failures and operate reliably. 
The performance of the all abovementioned techniques in 
various loading levels are summarized in Table I, where the 
cases 1-4 and 5-7 are respectively related to the various 
loading levels in lagging and leading power factors. It can be 
concluded from this table that: 
 The recent developed methods [20]-[23] cannot reliably 
detect LOF failures caused by opening of the field 
circuit, i.e. Type-2 and Type-3. 
 LOFI and VQ methods generally can detect the Type-1 
LOF failures faster than the conventional scheme. 
 The conventional scheme covers all types of LOF 
failures. 
Indeed, the conventional R-X [5]-[7] and G-B [10] relays 
are enough to reliably diagnose all types of LOF failures. 
However, they are always susceptible to mal-operate during 
system disturbances such as SPS and OOS conditions. As 
reported in the literature [13]-[32], increasing the security and 
the speed of such relays are two main objectives that have led 
the researchers to develop new LOF protection schemes. 
Although, such goals are achieved by some of the recently 
proposed techniques, such methods have not paid enough 
attention to the reliability as a vital protection factor. Such 
reliability must be evaluated based on IEEE Standard 
C37.102-2006 [1] through a realistic framework to model 
different types of LOF failures. 
F. Performance assessment of different methods in the face of 
SPS and OOS conditions 
From the security point of view and as reported in [20]-[23], 
dR
dt
, SODAC and VQ methods are more secure in the face of 
SPS than the conventional R-X scheme [5]-[7]. 
The obtained simulation results in this section will show 
that the R-X [5]-[7] and G-B [10] schemes with the 
conventional settings are susceptible to exhibit mal-operation 
in the face of non-LOF system disturbances (e.g. SPS and 
OOS), as the main goal of researchers to develop new secure 
LOF protection schemes. 
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Fig. 8.  Comparing of different techniques performance in the face of LOF failures in Case1 (heavy load) including dR/dt [20] (the first row), 
SODAC [21] (the second row), VQ[22] (the third row), LOFI [23] (the forth row), the conventional R-X technique [5]-[7] (the fifth row) and G-B 
scheme [10] (the sixth row). 
1) SPS occurrence  
 Figure 9 (left column) shows the performance of the 
mentioned methods in the face of a sample SPS condition. To 
create such a condition, when the generator initially delivers 
0.4-j0.3 pu, a three phase short circuit fault is applied to the 
middle of L1 at t=1 s. The fault is cleared after 350 ms by 
circuit breakers opening in both ends of L1. So, the system 
experiences an SPS condition. As shown in Fig. 9 (left 
column), all recently proposed methods are secure in such 
condition and do not exhibit mal-operation. This is because of 
that LOF detection criterion is not achieved during SPS 
condition. Indeed, time settings to detect LOF in such schemes 
are large enough to avoid mal-operation. For instance in 
dR
dt
 
based scheme, it is crucial that 
dR
dt
 takes the negative values for 
1.7 s to detect an LOF, while the mal-operation will be 
avoided due to the fast bipolar variations of  
dR
dt
, as shown in 
Fig. 9 (the first row). Conversely, the conventional R-X and 
G-B schemes with the related time settings can cause an 
unwanted generator tripping, while they are unable to 
discriminate such a condition from LOF occurrence. 
  
0885-8977 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TPWRD.2019.2897739, IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery
TABLE I.  COMPARING OF THE PERFORMANCE OF RECENTLY PROPOSED LOF 
PROTECTION METHODS WITH THE CONVENTIONAL R-X AND G-B SCHEMES 
# 
Loading 
P+jQ 
(pu) 
LOF 
Type 
Performance Assessment 
 (Operation Time/ Not Detected (ND)) 
dR/dt 
[20] 
SODAC 
[21] 
VQ 
[22] 
LOFI 
[23] 
R-X 
[5] 
G-B 
[10] 
1 
0.9+j0.2 
(Lagging PF) 
1 3.765 4.407 1.705 1.071 3.782 3.414 
2 ND ND ND 1.023 0.844 0.903 
3 ND ND ND ND 0.598 0.601 
2 
0.7+j0.5 
(Lagging PF) 
1 5.619 6.299 1.707 1.083 5.143 4.83 
2 ND ND ND 1.038 1.149 1.213 
3 ND ND ND ND 0.721 0.769 
3 
0.5+j0.3 
(Lagging PF) 
1 5.56 7.375 1.711 1.092 6.967 6.818 
2 1.954 ND 1.706 1.011 1.666 1.636 
3 ND ND ND ND 1.063 1.022 
4 
0.3+j0.1 
(Lagging PF) 
1 4.764 5.383 1.713 1.134 9.012 9.137 
2 2.881 ND ND ND 1.913 1.954 
3 ND ND ND ND 1.061 1.029 
5 
0.8-j0.2 
(Leading PF) 
1 4.035 5.252 1.71 1.116 3.151 2.809 
2 ND ND ND ND 0.825 0.925 
3 ND ND ND ND 0.506 0.541 
6 
0.5-j0.5 
(Leading PF) 
1 1.709 5.781 1.726 1.173 2.039 2.504 
2 ND ND ND 1.086 0.876 0.871 
3 ND ND ND ND 0.479 0.592 
7 
0.3-j0.1 
(Leading PF) 
1 1.726 5.941 1.738 1.203 9.143 9.579 
2 ND ND ND ND 1.319 1.462 
3 ND ND ND ND 0.479 0.592 
 
2) OOS occurrence  
To create an OOS condition, a three phase short circuit fault 
with clearing time of 360 ms is applied on the middle of L1, 
while the generator initially delivers 0.6-j0.4 pu. Figure 9 
(right column) illustrates the performance of different schemes 
in the face of such a condition. As can be seen, all the recently 
developed methods [20]-[23] behave securely in the face of 
this condition, due to the fast and bipolar variations of the 
used indices. Alternatively, the R-X and G-B schemes exhibit 
mal-operation during such condition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is shown in this paper that evaluating the proposed LOF 
protection techniques must be done in a comprehensive 
environment, such as the RTDS. Therefore, a realistic 
framework is suggested for this purpose by using the phase 
domain generator model in the RTDS, which allows the user 
to model the generator field circuit with more details and 
apply the various types of the probable LOF events in the 
generator field circuit as mentioned in IEEE Standard 
C37.102-2006. 
Simulation studies carried out on a SMIB system approved 
that the various generator dynamics during different types of 
LOF events must be considered to develop the new LOF 
protection algorithms, while it is shown in this paper that some 
of the recently proposed schemes (against the conventional R-
X and G-B ones) are unreliable to detect LOF failures caused 
by the field open circuit events. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
the suggested framework developed in the RTDS becomes 
clear in comparison with the conventional power system 
simulation programs. 
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Fig. 9. Comparing of different techniques performance in the face of  
sample SPS (left) and OOS (right) condition including dR/dt [20] (the first 
row), SODAC [21] (the second row), VQ[22] (the third row), LOFI [23] 
(the fourth row), conventional R-X scheme [5]-[7] (the fifth row) and the G-
B scheme [10] (the sixth row). 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE  A1. SMIB SYSTEM PARAMETERS 
Synchronous Generator Transformer Lines (L1&L2) 
S=200 MVA,  f=50 Hz,  V=10.4 kV, 
H=3.165 s, 𝑋𝑙=0.1 pu, 𝑅𝑠=0.0012 pu 
𝑋𝑑=1.72 pu, 𝑋𝑑
′  =0.23 pu,𝑋𝑑
′′ =0.2 pu, 
𝑋𝑞=1.66 pu, 𝑋𝑞
′  =0.2 pu,𝑋𝑑
′′ =0.2 pu, 
𝑇𝑑𝑜
′ = 8.125 𝑠, 𝑇𝑑𝑜
′′ = 𝑇𝑞𝑜
′′ = 0.0272 𝑠 
S=210 MVA, 
10.4/230 kV 
Uk%= 8% 
L= 100 km 
Z+=0.0185+j0.376 
Ω/km 
Z0=0.361+1.227 
Ω/km 
 
TABLE  A2. EXCITATION SYSTEM PARAMETERS 
IEEE Type-1 standard 
system [41] 
Crowbar  Surge Arrester [36] 
Tr=0 s, Ka=200, Ta=0.02, 
Ke=0.1, Te=0.4, Kf=0.0345, 
Tf= 1.5, E1=6.08, 
Se1=0.062, E2=6.83, 
Se2=0.132, Vmax= 10.33, 
Vmin=-3.6  
Crowbar resistance: 
Rc= 1Ω 
(Field resistance: 
Rf=0.2 Ω) 
Discharge Voltage: 
Vd=1.2 Kv 
Discharge Current: 
Id=10 KA 
N=16  
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑑  
𝑉
𝑉𝑑
 
𝑁
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TABLE A3. GOVERNOR PARAMETERS 
IEEE Type-G1 Governor 
K=10, T1=0.05s, T2=0.05s, T3=0.05s, T4=0.22s, T5=5s, T6=0.1s, T7=0.1s, 
Uo=0.1, Uc=-10, K1=0.27, K2=0, K3=0, K4=0, K5=0.25, K6=0, K7=0.48, 
K8=0,  Pmax=1 pu, Pmin=0.1 pu, 
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